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I.   INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
Legal Voice is a regional non-profit public interest organization 
that works to advance the legal rights of women and LGBTQ people in the 
Pacific Northwest through litigation, legislative advocacy, and legal rights 
education. Since its founding in 1978 as the Northwest Women’s Law 
Center, Legal Voice has participated as counsel and as amicus curiae in 
cases throughout the Northwest and the country involving gender 
discrimination, including sexual harassment and sex discrimination in the 
workplace, educational settings, and in public accommodations. Legal 
Voice was counsel in one of the few Washington Supreme Court cases 
involving a claim of sex discrimination in a place of public 
accommodation, Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. 
Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 59 P.3d 655 
(2002). Legal Voice has a strong interest in ensuring that the Washington 
Law Against Discrimination is interpreted to fully protect against all forms 
of gender-based discrimination and harassment. 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
(“Korematsu Center”) is a nonprofit organization based at Seattle 
University School of Law and works to advance justice through research, 
advocacy, and education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing 




War II that led to the internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, and later 
became an advocate for civil rights of others who are victims of 
discrimination. The Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring 
that effective remedies exist to address discrimination. The Korematsu 
Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of 
Seattle University. 
II.   INTRODUCTION 
The places of public accommodation in our state – from hotels to 
restaurants to Starbucks coffee shops – have been subject to the 
Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) for over half a century. 
Yet, in that timeframe, the appellate courts have had occasion to consider 
the contours of that law on fewer than a dozen occasions, and, before now, 
have never considered whether proprietors can be held liable for 
discrimination leveled at patrons by the clerks, waiters, and baristas who 
serve them. This dearth of authority underscores a problem of under-
enforcement; it does not, however, invite the Court to borrow a legal 
construct from employment claims that arise under a different provision of 
the WLAD simply because the construct is there, and it is familiar. The 
Court of Appeal’s decision on this issue of first impression does not 
“conflict” with employment cases such as Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific 




language of WLAD’s public accommodation provision and furthers its 
separate aims. The decision should be affirmed.   
III.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Amici Curiae adopt the Statement of the Case as outlined by Mr. 
Floeting in his Answer to Group Health’s Petition for Review. 
IV.   ARGUMENT 
A. The WLAD Is Construed Liberally to Effectuate the 
Purpose of the Act 
Washington State has a long and proud tradition of being on the 
forefront of promoting civil rights. In 1949, the Legislature enacted anti-
discrimination laws targeting the workplace;
1
 in 1957, it added further 
protections in places of public accommodations and publicly-assisted 
housing;
2
 and in 1973, it passed anti-discrimination laws protecting 
persons with disabilities.
3
 All of these state law enactments preceded 
similar provisions under the federal 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1968 Fair 
Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
respectively.  
What is more, the WLAD has a broader reach than analogous 
federal laws; for example, it protects women, breastfeeding mothers, and 
                                                 
1
 Laws of 1949, ch. 183, § 1. 
2
 Laws of 1957, ch. 37, §2. 
3
 Laws of 1973, ch. 141 (adding sex, marital status and age); Laws of 1973, ch, 214 




LGBTQ people from discrimination in places of public accommodation.
4
 
RCW 49.60.040; see also WAC 162-32-040 (describing prohibited 
harassment based on gender identity/expression in place of public 
accommodation). And in contrast to federal anti-discrimination legislation, 
our state statute includes express and emphatic language, directing the 
courts to construe the Act liberally to effectuate its purpose. RCW 
49.60.020; see also Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d at 247 (noting 
the statute should be liberally construed).   
B. The Legislature Broadly Defined “Full Enjoyment” 
In the public accommodations context, the right to be free from 
discrimination means the right to “full enjoyment” of the services and 
privileges offered. RCW 49.60.030. Being denied or deprived of such 
services on the basis of one’s protected class is an affront to personal 
dignity. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 553, 187 Wn.2d 
804, 825 (2017) (holding that flower shop owner’s refusal to provide 
services to same-sex couple violated WLAD’s public accommodation 
provision and noting the “grave and continuing harm” associated with 
such discrimination) (citations omitted); see also Anderson v. Pantages 
Theater Co., 114 Wn. 24, 31, 194 P. 813 (1921) (“The act [of 
discrimination] alleged in itself carries with it the elements of an assault 
                                                 
4




upon the person, and in such cases the personal indignity inflicted, the 
feeling of humiliation and disgrace engendered, and the consequent mental 
suffering are elements of actual damages.”); accord Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 
258 (1964) (the “fundamental object” of laws banning discrimination in 
public accommodations is “to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity 
that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments”) 
(internal citation and quotations omitted).  
Under the WLAD, “full enjoyment” in places of public 
accommodation is broadly defined: 
‘Full enjoyment of’ includes he right to purchase any 
service, commodity, or article of personal property offered 
or sold on, or by, any establishment to the public, and the 
admission of any person to accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, 
accommodation, assemblage, or amusement, without acts 
directly or indirectly causing persons of any particular race, 
creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, or with 
any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a 
trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a 
disability, to be treated as not welcome, accepted, desired, 
or solicited. 
RCW 49.60.040(14). Said another way, WLAD’s guarantee of “full 
enjoyment,” extends beyond outright denial of service to include 
mistreatment that causes a person in a protected class to feel “not 
welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.” Id. Group Health has now 




reach of WLAD’s public accommodation provisions. See Pet. at 2. This 
brief, therefore, focuses on whether proprietors are liable for the 
harassment carried out by employees. 
C. The Plain Language of Section 215 Makes Proprietors 
Directly Liable for Harassment Leveled Against 
Patrons 
Group Health urges the Court to define the scope of liability for 
proprietors of public accommodations (Section 215) by importing agency-
principal rules of liability applied to discrimination claims against 
employers (Section 180). The predictable effect of Group Health’s 
proposed construction is to narrow the entity’s risk and exposure. As the 




The public accommodations provision of the WLAD makes 
entities (persons) directly liable for the acts of employees:  
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person’s 
agent or employee to commit an act which directly or 
indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or 
discrimination….[in a place of public accommodation].  
RCW 49.60.215 (emphasis added). The provision is plain on its face: any 
“person” is directly liable for the unfair acts of his or her (or its) 
                                                 
5
 The starting point for determining legislative intent is the language of the statute. See 
Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002); State 
v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). If the language is plain on its face, as 
here, the Court goes no further. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 




“employee” separate and apart from the acts of any “agent” of the entity. 
That is, the Legislature calls out the concept of agency separately, by 
using the disjunctive (“or”), between “agent” and “employee.” Id.  No 
other construction of the statute is required because it is plain on its face; 
Group Health is liable for T.T.’s misconduct because, simply enough, T.T. 
is Group Health’s employee. 
In fact, there are fourteen different “unfair practices” provisions 
under the WLAD, and the Legislature chose just two instances in which 
the acts of employees would be automatically imputed to the entity: (1) the 
public accommodations provision (Section 215), quoted above, and (2) the 
provision that follows it, concerning discrimination against persons with 
disabilities who use service animals in eating establishments (section 218). 
Both use the identical direct-liability phrase (“a person or a person’s agent 
or employee”), in stark contrast to the other dozen provisions. See, e.g., 
RCW 49.60.176 (making “any person” liable for unfair practices in 
connection with credit transactions); .178 (same as to insurance 
transactions); .180 (making any “employer” liable for employment 
discrimination); .222 (making “any person” liable in connection to real 
estate transactions); .190 (making any “labor union or labor organization” 




“employment agency” liable for discrimination); .223 (making any 
“person” liable as to rental or sale of property in a given neighborhood).  
Although all provisions of the WLAD target unlawful 
discrimination, the Legislature defined the contours of “unfair practice” in 
a manner that is context specific. As to Section 215, the Legislature 
broadly declares it an unfair practice to commit an act that results “directly 
or indirectly” in (1) “any distinction, restriction, or discrimination” in a 
place of public accommodation, or (2) requires any person to pay more 
than the uniform rates charged other persons, or (3) “refus[e] or 
withhold[]” admission from any person because of her protected status. 
RCW 49.60.215 (emphasis added). The employment provision, 
meanwhile, declares it an unfair practice for an employer (1) to “refuse to 
hire any person” based on protected status (2) to “discharge or bar” such a 
person from employment (3) to discriminate in compensation or in any 
terms or conditions of employment, or (4) to, inter alia discriminate in 
advertising for a position. RCW 49.60.180. On their face, the two 
provisions have distinct prohibitions, specific to the context. Conduct that 
results in “any” “distinction, restriction, or discrimination” in the “full 
enjoyment” of public accommodation services is markedly distinct in both 




sufficient to disrupt the “terms or conditions” of the employment 
relationship.  
In light of this, we must presume, as the Court of Appeals did, that 
the addition of direct (or imputed) liability – in just two of a dozen 
provisions of the WLAD was intentional – not by accident – and a result 
of the unique context in which the particular discrimination occurs. Cf. In 
re Det. of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 (2002) (presuming 
that the use of language in one provision of a statute that differs from 
another was intentional, applying “expressio unius” canon of statutory 
construction); accord Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 
113 S. Ct. 2035, 124 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983)) (reasoning 
that where lawmakers include particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another, it is presumed that the Legislature acts 
“intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”).   
D. Direct Liability Furthers the Purpose of Section 215 
A plain language reading of Section 215 to allow for direct liability 
in the public accommodations setting makes sense when applied to the 
real world. Unlike dealings in the workplace where employees and 
employers owe to one another a myriad of duties and interact day after 




Mr. Floeting’s was not).
6
 Take, for example, a lifeguard who levels anti-
immigrant, Islamophobic insults toward a Somali man and his hijab-
wearing daughter. The most likely outcome is that the father will simply 
take his daughter elsewhere, leaving the lifeguard to repeat her offenses on 
the next Muslim family. In the very unlikely event the father summons the 
courage to complain, the very most he will get, according to Group 
Health, is an apology. Under Group Health’s view, the pool owner is 
never liable for the unquestionably unfair practice of its lifeguard unless 
he also happens to be the pool manager (i.e., the owner’s “agent”) or 
unless upper-management had notice of prior, similar incidents and failed 
to take action. Absent one of these two conditions, Group Health argues, 
no liability attaches to the owner no matter how offensive, degrading, or 
harmful the lifeguard’s conduct. 
Not only does Group Health’s argument run afoul of the plain 
language of the direct-liability provision in the statute, it has the perverse 
effect of creating a “no liability” rule in the vast majority of cases. As the 
court below recognized, consumer encounters typically occur with rank-
                                                 
6
 There are occasional exceptions where an individual’s contact with the public 
accommodation may be repeated and not fleeting--as in this case, where both 
Mr.  Floeting’s health care needs and his insurance required him to return to the same 
location for services. Those exceptions merely mean that the business owner has an even 
greater opportunity for notice of its employee’s discriminatory conduct. They do not 
obviate the real-world need for a different standard in public accommodations claims to 





and-file employees – clerks, salespeople, receptionists – not with owners 
and managers. Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 200 Wn. App. 758, 771, 
403 P.3d 559 (2017); cf. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803, 810 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting strict adherence to agency principles in public 
accommodation context because “a rule that only actions by supervisors 
are imputed to the employer would result, in most cases, in a no liability 
rule”). The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the WLAD’s 
purpose in the context of public accommodations would be frustrated by a 
liability rule that adheres to agency principles. Floeting, 200 Wn. App. at 
771. Indeed, without the imposition of direct liability, owners and 




E. Defining Liability as Context-Specific Is Not a “Double 
Standard” 
For its part, Group Health not does present any theory of statutory 
construction that would call for the Court to borrow agency liability 
principles developed in one of the fourteen “unfair practices” provisions 
(section 180) in order to construe WLAD’s public accommodation 
provision (Section 215) more narrowly than how the Legislature wrote it. 
                                                 
7
 The concern in Arguello for avoiding perverse results is equally warranted here, but this 
Court is not so constrained by the common law backdrop as the Fifth Circuit was in 
construing claims under federal civil rights statutes (section 1981 and 1983) which 




It simply urges the Glasgow standard to avoid what it self-servingly 
describes as a “dizzying” “double standard.”   
First, even setting aside the difference in the plain language of the 
two provisions, it is not a “double standard” to treat liability differently 
from one context to another. Indeed, that is the near daily work of our 
courts and our lawmakers; i.e., to circumscribe liability according to the 
relationship between the actors and the context they find themselves in – 
from landlord-tenant to owner-invitee to employer-employee and so on.  
Second, this Court should not opt for a standard of agency-
principal liability just because it is familiar. For starters, no Washington 
court has articulated why, exactly, WLAD’s scope of employer liability is 
coterminous with that under Title VII when the text of the two statutes 
differs in many respects. Compare RCW 49.60.040(11) (definition of 
“employer” includes “any person…who employs….”) with 42 U.S.C. 
2000e(b) (“Title VII”) (definition of “employer” includes “a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce … and any agent of such a 
person…”); and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55, 
118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998) (reasoning that Congress 
intended the courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles in 
light of the fact that “employer” is defined under Title VII to include 




common law agency principles in defining the scope of employer liability 
is not altogether clear, although it is now a well-worn path. See Glasgow, 
103 Wn.2d at 407 n.2 (citing federal appellate decisions construing Title 
VII as instructive for determining the elements of a sexual harassment 
claim in the employment context). And while the logic of adopting such a 
theory of liability in the employment context is beyond the scope of the 
issues presented, the problems of such a regime should not be lightly 
“borrowed” in the name of consistency or familiarity. See Catherine Fisk 
& Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability 
Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 
755, 757 (1999) (discussing the “puzzle of the inconsistency” for imputing 




The salient fact is that our Legislature chose to do something 
different here with respect to treatment of members of the public, such as 
consumers, in places of public accommodation. Undoubtedly, this is the 
province of the Legislature – to establish standards of conduct and 
attendant rules of liability in pursuit of public policy and the greater good. 
                                                 
8
 To add to the confusion, courts acknowledge that “common-law principles may not be 
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.” Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 755 
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 
2d 49 (1986).  But when, why, and how they apply is not always clear; the Court should 




See, e.g., Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wn. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978) 
(recognizing liability of tavern owner for harm caused by intoxicated 
minor, reasoning that the Legislature proscribed certain conduct, thus 
establishing a duty different from that at common law); accord United 
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 
(1975) (recognizing congressional intent to impose higher standard of care 
on food sellers, imposing criminal liability even where no awareness of 
wrongdoing, incentivizing those in position to act to prevent hazards). In 
drafting Section 215 to impose direct liability to the employer for the 
employee’s unfair practices, the Legislature has incentivized companies to 
take proactive steps to train and supervise their rank and file employees – 
(i.e., the people who actually interact with the customers) – to ensure 
compliance with the law. Cf. Park, 421 U.S. at 672-73. 
F. There is No Evidence that a Rule of Direct Liability 
Will Result in a Flood of Lawsuits  
This Court should view with a heavy dose of skepticism, Group 
Health’s suggestion that a rule of direct liability will open the floodgates 
to lawsuits. The public accommodation provision of the WLAD has 
existed for over a half-century; and laws protecting against race 
discrimination in public accommodations go back twice as far. See 
Anderson, 114 Wn. at 27 (quoting Rem. Code § 2686). Even so, there is a 




on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, and the like is any less 
prevalent in our theaters, pools, and coffee shops than it is in our 
workplaces, but while the latter has led to a vast body of decisional 
authority, there are by comparison almost no cases vindicating civil rights 
in places of public accommodations.  
The reality is that discrimination in our businesses and public 
places, however unconscionable, does not typically bring with it 
significant monetary damages – whether the harm is perpetrated by store 
owners or clerks. Unlike an employee who can recover lost wages when 
she is fired from her job for unlawful reasons, a customer who is harassed 
or targeted by a barista has no such claim.  Few people who have 
experienced harassment or discrimination in a place of accommodation 
will therefore be inclined to endure the stress of litigation for what would 
amount to a moral victory (particularly by the time the costs of suit are 
paid). And plaintiffs’ attorneys, more often than not paid on contingency, 
are unlikely to be willing to take on the risk of litigating such claims when 
the potential for recovery is effectively limited to fees. Affirming the 
Court of Appeals’ ruling will not change the structural issues that have 
limited the feasibility of bringing these claims for a half century. 
Moreover, floodgates arguments cannot be squared with the overriding 




of long histories of national and local discrimination. Xieng v. Peoples 
Nat. Bank of Washington, 120 Wn.2d 512, 521, 844 P.2d 389 (1993) 
(noting that the WLAD “embodies a public policy of the highest priority”) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted); RCW 49.60.010 (declaring that 
“discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its 
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free 
democratic state”).   
G. Discrimination Poses Barriers to Accessing Health 
Care. 
Finally, Amici respectfully request the Court to consider the 
specific context of health care in which this case arises.  In the health care 
setting, harassment not only can itself create negative health impacts, but 
it also can result in denial and/or impairment of access to care in important 
and harmful ways. 
Critically, sexual or other forms of harassment in health care can 
discourage people from seeking care.
9
  For example, a provider who uses 
derogatory language when talking to a woman who is unmarried and 
                                                 
9
 When patients do not feel comfortable as a result of harassment or because of a 
provider’s perceived implicit or explicit bias, they are less likely to get comprehensive 
medical care. See, e.g., Irene Blair et al., Clinicians’ Implicit Ethnic/Racial Bias and 
Perceptions of Care Among Black and Latino Patients, 11 Annals of Family Med. 43, 43 
(2013) (finding that “clinicians’ implicit bias may jeopardize their clinical relationships 
with black patients, which could have negative effects on other care processes”); Valerie 
Ulene, Doctors and Nurses’ Weight Biases Harm Overweight Patients, L.A. Times 
(Dec. 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/13/health/la-he-the-md-weight-bias-
20101213 (discussing negative health implications of stigma and bias by providers 




sexually active or pregnant may create a hostile environment that could 
keep her from accessing needed reproductive health care.
10
 
Discrimination in health care settings can be particularly 
pronounced when individuals identify with more than one protected class. 
For example, African American women generally receive lower quality 
medical services than White women, with disparities in early diagnosis of 
breast cancer and maternal death rates worsening in recent years.
11
  In 
addition, the percentage of women reporting that their provider did not 
listen, explain things clearly, respect what they had to say, or spend 




Along with African American and undocumented individuals, 
many transgender and gender non-conforming individuals also report 
being verbally, and sometimes physically, harassed in medical settings.
13
  
                                                 
10
 Texas Policy Evaluation Project, Barriers to Family Planning Access in Texas 1 (May 
2015), http://www.utexas.edu/cola/txpep/_files/pdf/TxPEP-ResearchBrief_Barriers-to-
Family-Planning-Access-inTexas_May2015.pdf (showing that 30% of respondents 
reported “Don’t feel comfortable with healthcare providers” as a barrier to accessing 
reproductive health care.). 
11
 Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
AHRQ Pub. No. 13-0003, National Healthcare Disparities Report 2012 10-5 (2013), 
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr12/nhdr12_prov.pdf. 
12
 Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
AHRQ Pub. No. 12-0006-3-EF, Disparities in Healthcare Quality Among Minority 
Women: Findings from the 2011 National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Reports 6 
(2012), available at https://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhqrdr11/minority-
women.pdf.  
13
 Jaime M. Grant et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal. & Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task 




A 2010 study found that 70 percent of transgender respondents and nearly 
56 percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents reported experiencing 
at least one instance of discrimination or patient profiling when attempting 
to access health services.
14
 The negative impacts of such discrimination 
are striking: 48 percent of transgender and gender non-conforming 
individuals report postponing seeking care when sick or injured and 50 
percent report postponing or avoiding preventive care.”
 15 
Patients often do not have much choice in providers or health 
systems.  Indeed, most health insurance covers care for its insured that is 
limited to a network of providers.  Thus, they are in effect a captive 
audience for services that can literally have life or death consequences. 
Because of the potentially low monetary damages involved – one 
may be tempted to diminish the significance of discriminatory conduct in 
places of public accommodation.  As this discussion about access to 
health care reveals, discrimination in the provision of services has 
implications beyond dignitary harm. Indeed, Mr. Floeting could not 
                                                                                                                         
(Oct. 2010), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDSReportonHealth_final.pdf.  
See also Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, 
available at http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-
FINAL.PDF (reporting survey results showing that in the past year, 23% of respondents 
did not see a doctor when they needed to because of fear of being mistreated as a 
transgender person). 
14
 Lambda Legal, When Health Care Isn’t Caring: Lambda Legal’s Survey of 








simply “shop” elsewhere for the services he needed, nor should the law 
require him to.   
V.   CONCLUSION 
Our Legislature enacted public accommodation protections in 
1957, just two years after Rosa Parks sparked the Montgomery bus 
boycotts. The protest surrounding mistreatment of African Americans in 
public-facing venues comprise the bedrock of our civil rights movement 
and assuredly informed the passage of Section 215 of the WLAD.  And 
while discrimination in our coffee shops and doctor’s offices may express 
itself differently today than it did 50 plus years ago, the evil of differential 
and dehumanizing treatment persists and continues to create barriers to 
participation in public life and in the marketplace. If we are to achieve 
“full enjoyment” for all Washingtonians, then the entities who open their 
doors to the public - and indeed, benefit from public patronage – must be 
held to account for the misconduct of their employees. Amici urge this 
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